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2013 / A Comparative Legal Study of the Amanda Knox Case
I. INTRODUCTION
Amanda Knox was an ordinary twenty-year-old college student who left her
1
hometown of Seattle to study abroad in the storybook town of Perugia, Italy. Her
2
life appeared on course with the modern American dream. However, the brutal
murder of her British roommate, Meredith Kercher, a few months into her
3
semester abroad destroyed any semblance of normal in Knox’s life. Overnight,
she went from the girl next-door to the face on the front page of every major
4
newspaper. It did not take long for the American, Italian, and British media to
begin inserting their own sordid narrative into the already gruesome and
disturbing murder. With headlines like “Amanda Knox the She-Devil or the
5
6
Innocent?,” “The Wild, Raunchy Past of Foxy-Knoxy,” and “Knox: Innocent
7
Abroad or Getting Away with Murder?,” it is no surprise that strong emotions
and opinions across the globe formed following this media frenzy.
By the time the Italian court eventually tried and found Knox guilty of the
murder of Meredith Kercher, everyone was talking—including the American
8
legal community. The American media took an increasingly pro-Knox slant,
fueled in part by some legal commentators who criticized the Italian trial of
9
Amanda Knox. These criticisms had the obvious effect of upsetting the Italian

1. Laura Smith-Spark, Hada Messia, & Ben Wedeman, Amanda Knox Vows to Fight on as Italian Judges
Orer Trial in Murder Case, CNN (March 27, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/26/world/europe/italyamanda-knox-case/index.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
2. NINA BURLEIGH, THE FATAL GIFT OF BEAUTY: THE TRIALS OF AMANDA KNOX 51–54 (2011)
(idyllically describing young Amanda’s life and the work she did to achieve her dream of studying in Italy).
3. Smith-Spark et al., supra note 1.
4. Freedom for Unlikely Murder Suspect Amanda Knox, THE AUSTRALIAN (Oct. 4, 2011, 7:50 AM),
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/freedom-for-unlikely-murder-suspect-amanda-knox/storye6frg6so-1226157734621 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
5. Nick Squires, Amanda Knox the She-Devil or the Innocent?, THE TELEGRAPH (Oct. 2, 2011, 8:34 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/8802685/Amanda-Knox-the-she-devil-or-theinnocent-Foxy-Knoxys-day-of-judgment.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
6. Andrew Malone, The Wild, Raunchy Past of Foxy-Knoxy, THE DAILY MAIL (Dec. 3, 2007, 7:58 AM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-498853/The-wild-raunchy-past-Foxy-Knoxy.html (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
7. Andrew Vogt, Knox: Innocent Abroad or Getting Away with Murder?, THE WEEK (Sept. 21, 2011,
8:47 AM), http://www.theweek.co.uk/people-news/amanda-knox-free/2053/knox-innocent-abroad-or-’gettingaway-murder’ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
8. See Nina Burleigh, Why There Will Always Be Three Amanda Knoxes, TIMES (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2095586,00.html [hereinafter Burleigh, Three Amanda Knoxes]
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that Knox received favorable treatment from American
network producers and journalists).
9. See e.g., Liz Robbins, An American in the Italian Wheels of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2009, 7:24
PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/05/an-american-in-the-italian-wheels-of-justice/ (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (citing law professor George P. Fletcher referring to the trial as a “scandal of the
first order . . .”).
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and British media, which had formed a very negative opinion of Knox early on,
but likely had farther-reaching consequences as well.
Much of this criticism was couched in comparative terms, which made clear
that the American criminal justice system would never have allowed such an
11
unjust trial, implying, if not outright stating, the American system’s superiority.
This Comment will call into question the veracity of these claims, as well as their
ultimate impact. A comparative analysis of the trial’s two most pivotal and
criticized aspects, involving the admission of two types of evidence, will
demonstrate how this evidence could have received similar treatment in a US
court, potentially leading to the same “unfair” guilty verdict. Further, a
comparative analysis of the appeal will demonstrate that Knox would not have
received an acquittal for the same appeal in the American court system and so
would likely still be serving her sentence.
This practical example cautions the American legal community against
making extensive criticisms of foreign legal systems that either explicitly state or
imply that foreign system’s inferiority in cases like this one, where the same
result could have come in the US trial court, with no chance for Knox to appeal
(as she did in the Italian system). Part II begins with an overview of the Amanda
Knox trial and appeals in Italy. Part III places the Knox trial in the American
court system in order to compare the Italian and American procedural and
evidentiary rules at issue. Part IV completes the comparison by placing the Knox
appeal in the American appellate system.
II. SEX, DRUGS, AND PUBLIC OPINION: THE ITALIAN TRIAL AND APPEAL OF
AMANDA KNOX
12

The trial and initial appeal of Amanda Knox lasted 1,427 days. The
13
dramatic and emotional trial garnered incredible international media attention.
14
The trial spurred a zealous response from the American public, while the
10. See Alessandra Rizzo, Defense: Knox ‘Crucified’ in Italian Media, WASHINGTON TIMES, Sept. 29,
2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/sep/29/defense-knox-crucified-italian-media/?page=all (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (quoting Knox’s lawyer as saying, “Knox has been crucified, impaled in a
public square, subjected to the most sinister of speculations” by the Italian media); see also Burleigh, Three
Amanda Knoxes, supra note 8 (stating that in the United Kingdom, Knox is “the exchange-student version of
Casey Anthony . . . ”).
11. See Doug Saunders, In Knox Case, Europe’s Justice System was also on Trial, THE GLOBE & MAIL
(Oct. 3, 2011, 8:50 AM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/in-knox-case-europes-justice-systemwas-also-on-trial/article555622/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“The guilty verdict of Ms. Knox in
2009 caused a number of prominent Americans, including celebrity lawyer Alan Dershowitz, to lash out at the
European system.”).
12. BRUCE FISHER, FINDING JUSTICE IN PERUGIA i (2011).
13. Id. (“During that time a movie was made, books were written, Wikipedia went haywire, online blog
wars raged on, journalists were harassed, . . . an Anti-Knox hate group was formed, [as well as] a grass roots
effort . . . even Italian politicians chimed in . . . .”).
14. This response was highly polarized. Support groups, such as “Friends of Amanda,” sprung up, but so
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American legal community entered the debate with forceful commentary of its
15
own. As the world watched, Knox and her boyfriend, Rafael Sollecito, were
16
convicted in December 2009 for the murder of Meredith Kercher. Their joint
17
appeal began in June of 2011; their murder convictions were eventually
18
reversed in October of 2011.
A. The Murder of Meredith Kercher
Meredith Kercher was a twenty-year-old student from the United Kingdom
when she arrived in Perugia, Italy in September of 2007 to study political theory
19
and history of cinema at the University of Perugia. Amanda Knox, also twenty,
was a junior at the University of Washington when she came to Perugia to study
20
Italian at the Universita per Stranieri. The two lived together, along with two
21
other roommates, at 7 via della Pergola, the eventual scene of the murder.
Amanda met Raffaele Sollecito, a twenty-three-year-old Italian student at the
University of Perugia and her alleged accomplice, on October 25th at a classical
22
music concert at Knox’s university. Meredith Kercher was found murdered on
23
November 2, 2007 in the bedroom of her Perugia apartment. Her body was
discovered on the floor, under a duvet cover, partially dressed and with three
24
knife wounds to the neck.
According to Knox, on the morning of November 2, she returned home from
Sollecito’s house (where she had spent the night) to a series of suspicious
findings: the front door was open (despite no one being home), a few drops of
blood were visible in the bathroom Knox and Kercher shared, and feces were

did anti-Knox groups like “True Justice.” Cf FRIENDS OF AMANDA KNOX, http://www.friendsofamanda.
org/home_eng.html (last visited March 7, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (defining itself as a
“site devoted to truth about Amanda Knox and the charges against her”), with TRUE JUSTICE FOR MEREDITH
KERCHER, http://truejustice.org/ee/index.php (last visited Sept. 16, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
15. See generally Robbins, supra note 9 (quoting various legal commentators on their opinion of the
Amanda Knox trial).
16. FISHER, supra note 12.
17. Elisabetta Povoledo, Amanda Knox’s Murder Conviction Appeal Begins in Italy, N.Y. TIMES, June
28, 2011, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/28/world/Europe/28knox.html?_r=0 (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
18. Id. Laura Smith-Spark, et al., supra note 1.
19. See BURLEIGH, THE FATAL GIFT OF BEAUTY, supra note 2, at xvii.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 66–68.
22. Id. at xxiv.
23. Squires, supra note 5.
24. Tom Kington, Meredith Kercher Murder: Break-in and Handprint Clues at Isolated Cottage, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2011, 5:50 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/03/meredith-kercher-murderburglary-perugia (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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found in the toilet of the other bathroom. It was a holiday weekend, and the
other two girls sharing the apartment were out of town, as were the four boys
26
who lived below them. Knox stated that she returned to Sollecito’s to consult
with him and that the two decided to revisit the apartment; on their way, they
27
called Sollecito’s sister, a police officer, to ask for advice. They later called
Knox’s other roommate and the Italian police. Eventually, after breaking down
28
her locked door, the group found Kercher dead in her room. Police took Knox,
Sollecito, and the other roommates and friends of Kercher to the station for
29
questioning. Knox was questioned from November 2nd–6th. During a late night
interrogation on November 5th–6th, she made a highly contested confession that
she was present at the scene of the crime during the murder and accused her boss,
30
café owner Patrick Lumumba, of committing the act. Following this statement,
31
police arrested Knox. Police then arrested Patrick Lumumba on November 6th;
32
he was later released on November 20, 2007 when police corroborated his alibi.
In December of that year, officials caught Rudy Guede, a known Perugian
drug dealer and petty criminal, trying to board a train in Germany without a
33
ticket. Guede had become another of the police’s suspects when investigators
34
discovered his bloody fingerprint on a pillow at the crime scene. He was
35
extradited back to Italy and taken into police custody. Guede was charged in
36
2008 with first-degree murder and sentenced to sixteen years in prison.
25. See BURLEIGH, THE FATAL GIFT OF BEAUTY, supra note 2, at 173.
26. Id. at 141–42.
27. Id. at 174. Sollecito’s sister advised Knox and Sollecito to call the police, which they did. Id.
28. BARBIE NADEAU, ANGEL FACE: THE TRUE STORY OF STUDENT KILLER AMANDA KNOX 44–45
(2010).
29. See BURLEIGH, THE FATAL GIFT OF BEAUTY, supra note 2, at 176, 178, 180, 184, 193, 196 (detailing
Knox’s questioning by police during this timeframe).
30. Id. at 196. Amanda wrote in her statement to police: “In my mind I saw Patrik [sic] in flashes of red
images. I saw him near the basketball court. I saw him at the front door. I saw myself cowering in the kitchen
with my hands over my ears because in my head I could hear Meredith screaming.” Id. at 167. However,
Amanda also wrote: “I’ve said this many times to make myself clear: these things are unreal to me, like a
dream, and I am . . . not sure they are real things that happened or are just dreams my mind has made to try to
answer the questions in my head and the questions I am being asked.” Id.
31. NADEAU, ANGEL FACE, supra note 28, at 72.
32. Amanda Knox Trial: Key Dates in Case Against Former American Exchange Student Accused of
Roommate’s Murder, NY DAILY NEWS (March 26, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/key-datesamanda-knox-murder-case-article-1.1299223 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Nick Squires, Amanda
Knox: Guilty or Innocent, Five Reasons Why, THE TELEGRAPH (Oct. 3, 2011, 12:27), http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/8803077/Amanda-Knox-Guilty-or-innocent-five-reasonswhy.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that Lumumba spent the night of the murder talking
with a customer at his bar).
33. Nick Pisa, Rudy Guede: Portrait of Meredith’s Murderer As He Begins His 30 Year Sentence, THE
DAILY MAIL (Oct. 29, 2008, 5:20), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1081457/Rudy-Guede-PortraitMerediths-murderer-begins-30-year-sentence.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. BURLEIGH, THE FATAL GIFT OF BEAUTY, supra note 2, at xxvi–xxvii. His original sentence was thirty
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B. The Trial of Knox and Sollecito
37

The trial began in January of 2009. Perugia’s public prosecutor, Giuliano
Mignini, presented a case of desire and drama. His theory was that on November
1st, 2007 Knox slit Kercher’s throat while Guede and Sollecito restrained
38
39
Kercher after a sordid sex game. He painted Knox as a dangerous she-devil,
developing this image through extensive evidence, including writings from
40
Knox’s MySpace page, her Facebook page, and her prison diary. The
prosecution supplemented its motive theory with evidence taken from the crime
scene. This included DNA, said to be Sollecito’s, that was discovered on
Kercher’s bra clasp and DNA allegedly belonging to both Knox and Kercher
41
found on a knife in Sollecito’s kitchen. Additionally, the prosecution supplied
witnesses placing both Sollecito and Knox near the crime scene that night
(contradicting their joint alibi) and at a nearby store the next morning purchasing
42
bleach. The prosecution’s strongest evidence against Knox was her own signed
statement placing her at the scene of the crime and accusing her boss, Patrick
43
Lumumba, of committing the murder.
The defense’s case rested on the theory that Rudy Guede committed the
44
murder alone. The defense highlighted Guede’s criminal past of drug dealing
45
and robbery. They reminded the jury that Guede did not initially implicate Knox
46
as an accomplice, but changed his story before Knox’s trial. They stressed that
the only connection the prosecution could form between Guede and Knox was a
witness who testified that they had once both attended a party at the flat below

years, but this was eventually reduced to sixteen years. Id. at xxvii. Many commentators have posited that the
reduction was a “reward for placing [Knox and Sollecito] . . . at the [crime] scene…. NADEAU, ANGEL FACE
supra note 1, at 110.
37. Id.
38. Ann Wise & Nikki Battiste, Italian Prosecutor Says Amanda Knox Led Sex Assault on ‘Prissy’
Roommate, ABC WORLD NEWS (Nov. 20, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/International/amanda-knoxsummations-focus-break/story?id=9136104 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
39. Nina Burleigh, Did Amanda Knox Get a Fair Murder Trial, TIME (Dec. 5, 2009), http://www.time.
com/time/world/article/0,8599,1945845,00.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). At trial, Mignini
developed this image so far as to theorize Knox’s last words to Kercher: “she probably said, ‘[y]ou are always
behaving like a little saint. Now we will show you, and now we will make you have sex!’” Nina Burleigh,
Amanda Knox Murder Trial Moves Toward A Climax, TIME (Nov. 30, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/
world/article/0,8599, 1945845,00 .html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
40. Ian Fisher, Italian Murder Puts American Student in Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/12/world/europe/12iht-journal.4.8301930.html?r=0 (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); Burleigh, Three Amanda Knoxes, supra note 8.
41. Burleigh, Amanda Knox Murder Trial Moves Toward a Climax, supra note 39.
42. BURLEIGH, THE FATAL GIFT OF BEAUTY, supra note 2, at 276.
43. See Burleigh, Did Amanda Knox Get a Fair Murder Trial, supra note 39 (stating that the defense was
never able to overcome Knox’s incriminating statement).
44. Burleigh, Did Amanda Knox Get a Fair Murder Trial, supra note 39.
45. Id.
46. Id.

352

05_LENTH_VER_01_08-14-13_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/19/2013 2:27 PM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 45
47

48

Knox’s. Additionally, Guede had “denied ever having known” Sollecito. The
defense also sought to undo the prosecution’s theory of motive and the mound of
49
evidence it built against Knox. It did so by presenting its own evidence
corroborating Knox and Sollecito’s original alibis and by expert testimony
claiming “the amounts of biological material were too small to be verified, and
could have been the result of contamination either at the crime scene or in the
50
lab.” The defense also countered the effect of Knox’s statement to the police by
arguing that the officers had mentally and physically coerced Knox into giving
51
this statement. However, in spite of these efforts, on December 4th, 2009 Knox
was convicted of murder and given a twenty-six-year prison sentence; Sollecito
52
was also convicted of murder and received a twenty-five-year sentence.
C. Major Criticisms of the Trial
While critics of the trial are located worldwide, a stronghold exists in the
United States. As one British journalist wrote:
Backed by a well-organised support group of lawyers, scientists and
writers, Knox’s long divorced parents, Curt and Edda, have given a
string of US interviews, reinforcing the message that their daughter was
an innocent abroad and expressing their determination that their daughter
will not be allowed to rot in an Italian jail as rancid as the justice system
that put her there. They are hardly alone in voicing such sentiments. If
there are any lawyers in the US who actually agree with the Knox
verdict, the TV networks and major newspapers have so far failed to find
53
them.
While the statement is hyperbolic, its point is not without merit; the
American media frequently interviewed experts, specifically legal experts, who
54
argued that the Italian trial was unjust. For example, George P. Fletcher,

47. John Hooper, Was There a Plot to Murder Meredith?, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/05/meredith-kercher-murder-trial (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
48. Id.
49. See NADEAU. ANGEL FACE supra note 1, at 133 (relaying the defense’s cross-examination of the
state’s forensic experts).
50. See Burleigh, Did Amanda Knox Get a Fair Murder Trial, supra note 39.
51. See Exclusive, Amanda Knox Statement, CBS NEWS (Dec. 4, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/830118559_162-4936228.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting Knox’s statement to the court
that her false confession was the result of her abuse by the Italian police officers).
52. See BURLEIGH, THE FATAL GIFT OF BEAUTY, supra note 2, at xxvii.
53. Tom Leonard, Only Doubt Over Knox Conviction is Exactly How They Got It Wrong, THE
TELEGRAPH (Dec. 8, 2009, 7:01 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/67634
45/Only-doubt-over-Amanda-Knox-conviction-is-exactly-how-they-got-it-wrong.html (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
54. Burleigh, See Why There Will Always Be Three Amanda Knoxes, supra note 8 (“In the US, Knox is
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Columbia University’s Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, referred to the trial
55
as a “scandal of the first order.” Harvard law professor Alan Derschowitz
56
referred to the Italian legal system as “not among Europe’s most distinguished.”
He claimed that Knox’s guilty verdict was “totally predictable,” nothing more
57
than “a confirmation” of the questionable investigation.
The major criticisms centered on the following aspects of the Italian trial: the
58
joint trial of civil claims and criminal charges, the jury composition, the lack of
jury sequestration, introduction of character evidence by the prosecution, and
59
admission of Knox’s signed statements.
Critics interwove their censures of the justice system with their outrage over
the media coverage. Knox’s supporters blamed the Italian and British media’s
portrayal of Knox as a “sex crazed killer,” referring to her as “Foxy Knoxy” and
the “angel-faced killer,” as one reason Knox was doomed to receive an unfair
60
trial from the start. This image aligned closely with the prosecution’s theory of a
61
“sex game gone wrong.” Knox’s family and supporters strongly protested that
this theory was fabricated, along with many other important factors like motive
62
and timing of the murder. Finally, the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses
63
and the validity of the incriminating DNA evidence were points of contention.
D. The Italian Appeals
64

On November 24, 2010, Knox and Sollecito’s appeal began. The judge
agreed to require the prosecution’s key witness to retake the stand and allowed
65
independent court-appointed experts to retest the controversial DNA evidence.
the victim of a judicial system gone awry.”).
55. See Robbins, supra note 9.
56. See Leonard, supra note 53.
57. Id.
58. Unlike the US, Italy allows the joint trial of a civil and criminal claim before the same fact-finders.
Julia Grace Mirabella, Comment, Scales of Justice: Assessing Italian Criminal Procedure Through the Amanda
Knox Trial, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 229, 241 (2012).
59. Id. at 241–46; see Robbins, supra note 9.
60. See FISHER, supra note 12, at 48; see also Burleigh, Did Amanda Knox Get A Fair Murder Trial,
supra note 39 (“Many legal observers in the U.S. were dismayed, though not surprised, by the verdict, since
they felt all along that Knox had already been convicted in the Italian court of public opinion and had no real
shot at a fair trial.”).
61. Burleigh, Did Amanda Knox Get A Fair Murder Trial, supra note 39.
62. See Burleigh, Did Amanda Knox Get a Fair Murder Trial, supra note 39 (“During closing arguments,
prosecutors changed the estimated time of death, pushing it two hours later in order to better match the account
of a homeless man who came forward months after the arrests and claimed to have seen Sollecito and Knox
near the house where Kercher was stabbed to death on the night after Halloween 2007.”).
63. Id.
64. See BURLEIGH, THE FATAL GIFT OF BEAUTY, supra note 2, at xxvii.
65. See FISHER, supra note 12, at 9. This request for an independent review of the forensic evidence was
denied by the trial judge. Id. As will be discussed in more detail infra, the Italian system allows fact-finding at
the appellate level. See Part IV.A (detailing the Italian appeals process).
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The defense presented new witnesses and cross-examined Rudy Guede in court
66
for the first time. After hearing this witness and expert testimony during the
second trial, the court acquitted Knox and Sollecito of the murder of Meredith
67
Kercher on October 3, 2011. However, this was not the end of the case. On
March 25, 2013, Italy’s highest court overturned the acquittal and demanded a
68
69
retrial. Knox’s retrial began on September 30, 2013.
III. THE AMERICAN WAY: THE TRIAL OF AMANDA KNOX IN AN AMERICAN
COURTROOM
Throughout the Italian trial and appeal of Amanda Knox, the focus was often
70
on innocence or guilt. However, the trial verdict of guilt was the result of
procedure and evidence. Determining whether American criticisms of this verdict
were fair requires an in-depth look at the legal process leading to the result. This
Part will do so by analyzing the two most condemned elements of the trial: the
admission of Knox’s statement to police during questioning and the admission of
71
character evidence against Knox. First, an explanation for each admission in the
Italian system will be given, followed by a consideration of the same evidence
under American criminal procedure and evidentiary rules. This process will bring
to light the shortcomings of the American criticisms by demonstrating how and
why both admissions could have also occurred in the American legal system.
A. Admission of Knox’s Statement During Police Questioning
On November 2nd, when the Italian police initially questioned Sollecito, he
stated that he and Knox spent the entire evening at his apartment relaxing
together; he maintained this story each time he was questioned until November

66. Id. at 73.
67. Nick Squires, Amanda Knox Freed After Jury Overturns Controversial Murder Verdict, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR (Oct. 3 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2011/1003/Amanda-Knox-freedafter-jury-overturns-controversial-murder-verdict (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
68. Livia Borghese & Jason Hanna, Italian Court on Reason for Knox’s Retrial: Evidence Neglected,
CNN (July 19, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/18/world/europe/italy-amanda-knox-case/index.html (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
69. Amanda Knox Retrial Begins in Florence Sept. 30 After Italy’s High Court Overturned Acquittal,
STAR TRIBUNE (July 9, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/07/09/amanda-knox-retrial-begins-inflorence-sept-30-after-italy-high-court/#ixzz2a4pC22D5 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
70. This was demonstrated by the titles of books and news articles reporting on the trial. See, e.g., FISHER, supra
note 12, at Preface; Squires, Amanda Knox the She-Devil or the Innocent?, supra note 5; Vogt, supra note 7.
71. Hooper, Was There a Plot to Murder Meredith?, supra note 47; See also Steph Stradley, The Amanda
Knox Case: Character Assassination Versus Evidence, STRADLEY LAW, http://www.stradleylaw.com/theamanda-knox-case-character-assassination-versus-evidence/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2012) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (summarizing the American news media’s criticisms that the prosecution rested its case
on “character assassination . . .”).
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72

73

5th. On that evening, the police again asked Sollecito to come to the station.
74
Amanda Knox came along, doing her homework while she waited. Around
75
midnight Knox agreed to talk with police in an interrogation room. Those
76
questioning her eventually informed Knox that Sollecito had changed his story.
He was no longer providing an alibi for her between 9 p.m. and 1 a.m. on the
night of the murder, stating that he did not know where Knox was during this
77
time. At this point, the police and Knox recall different versions of the activities
78
that followed. The parties agree that throughout the all-night questioning a
79
dozen police officers were in the room. Knox claims that her interrogators
slapped her in the back of the head twice and that she went without food and
80
water for hours. The police deny these claims and filed slander charges against
81
Knox and her parents for making them.
At 1:45 a.m., Amanda Knox signed a statement written by the police in
82
Italian. The statement detailed the murder: on the night of November 2nd
Amanda met her boss, Patrick Lumumba, and at some point Meredith joined
83
them as well; Lumumba had sex with Meredith, and he killed her. Amanda
signed a second statement, which again stated Lumumba was the murderer, and
also wrote three pages of her own describing her “‘vision’ of meeting Patrick,
84
being in the murder house, [and] hearing the screams.” Critics have referred to
the admission of these statements as “the most damning single piece of evidence
85
against the young American.”

72. BURLEIGH, THE FATAL GIFT OF BEAUTY, supra note 2, at 191.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Barbie Nadeau, The Italian Job, THE DAILY BEAST (Oct. 6, 2009, 8:00 PM), http://www.thedaily
beast.com/newsweek/2012/08/12/the-italian-job.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
76. BURLEIGH, THE FATAL GIFT OF BEAUTY, supra note 2, at 194.
77. Id. at 192, 194. Sollecito would later state that police confused him by requiring him to recite where
Amanda was on the night before the murder. Id. at 193. He would also claim that the police told him they had
hard evidence against Amanda and that after many hours of questioning, without sleep or the presence of family
or a lawyer, he made this statement. Id. at 193.
78. Id. at 194.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 195; Hooper, Was There a Plot to Murder Meredith?, supra note 47.
81. Id. This trial was set to begin February 5, 2013. However, the Knox defense requested a change of
venue because of a conflict of interest: the assigned lead prosecutor (Giuliano Mignini) is one of the accusing
parties. Nikki Battiste, Amanda Knox’s Slander Trial Moved to Florence, ABCNEWs (Feb. 5, 2013, 4:01 PM),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/02/amanda-knoxs-slander-trial-moved-to-florence/ (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
82. BURLEIGH, THE FATAL GIFT OF BEAUTY, supra note 2, at 196.
83. Id. The statement read: “I remember confusedly that he killed her.” Id.
84. Id. at 199.
85. Hooper, Was There a Plot to Murder Meredith?, supra note 47.
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1. Admissibility of Knox’s Statement in the Italian Criminal System
As previously stated, the Italian court admitted Knox’s statement to the
86
police into evidence at trial. But the court did not admit the evidence for use in
the criminal case; the statement was admitted into evidence for the civil case
87
88
only. The two cases were tried together, however, in front of the same jury.
The Italian system grants a suspect a lawyer from the moment the police
89
question the suspect. It also requires that an interpreter be present for nonnative
90
speakers. Thus, police took Amanda Knox’s statement in violation of both of
these rules, and Italy’s highest court did, in fact, pronounce the statements
91
inadmissible in her criminal trial.
But because the Italian system tries civil and criminal cases together, the
92
statements were admitted. Knox’s trial included not only the criminal charge
against her, but also two civil cases: Lumumba’s defamation case filed against
Knox for her false statement that he murdered Kercher and Kercher’s family’s
civil suit against Knox. The court deemed the statements admissible for
93
Lumumba’s defamation case. Thus, the jury heard the statement during the
course of the joint trial.
Yet, criticizing the Italian system for allowing evidence because it is
admissible for one purpose but not for another hardly seems a fair criticism
coming from the American legal community. After all, Federal Rule of Evidence
105 allows the same practice so long as a jury instruction accompanies the
94
evidence. While not entirely analogous here, as the Italian system has separate
cases within the same trial rather than separate purposes within the same trial, it
does at least show that the criticism is misplaced. The potential problem lies not
with the Italian system’s failure to protect a suspect taken into custody by police,
but with its decision to try multiple cases together. As the following analysis of
Knox’s statement in the American criminal system will demonstrate, the Italian
criminal court’s approach affords a suspect in Knox’s circumstance more
protections than the American system.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Mirabella, supra note 58, at 242 n.79.
Id.
See Hooper, Was There a Plot to Murder Meredith?, supra note 47.
Id.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 105.
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2. Admissibility of Knox’s Statement in the American Criminal System
In an American court, one must start with the general rule that all relevant
95
evidence is admissible. Statements made by defendants to police about the
crime are almost always relevant and so the defendant must demonstrate why the
court should exclude the statement from evidence. Commonly, defendants object
96
that police violated their constitutional rights in obtaining the statement.
Specifically, they argue that the statement was involuntary or that the police did
97
not provide adequate Miranda warnings. An analysis of both of these possible
violations will demonstrate that it is far from certain that either would have kept
Knox’s statements out of evidence had she been tried in an American court.
i.

Inadmissibility of the Statements Due to a Voluntariness Violation
98

The Supreme Court stated in Lisenba v. California that the 14th
Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits the use of undue influence to induce a
99
defendant to confess and refuses to allow said confession into evidence. At the
trial level, the court applies a totality of the circumstances test to determine
100
involuntariness. Factors considered include police methods of coercion (threats
of violence, promised incentives, or the relaying of false statements to the
suspect), “the defendant’s peculiar susceptibility to police coercion,” “the
defendant’s character and life experiences,” and other surrounding
101
circumstances. In some cases, like torture and prolonged interrogation, the
Supreme Court comes close to establishing a per se finding of involuntariness,
102
but beyond that, the issue is decided case by case.

95. Id. at 402.
96. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET. AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 176–90 (2008) (discussing
the constitutional doctrines that support judicial regulation of confessions and interrogations by police).
97. Id. at 177–78, 186.
98. 314 U.S. 219, 240–41 (1941).
99. Id. at 236–37 (“As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to observe that
fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. In order to declare a denial of it we must find that
the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as
necessarily prevents a fair trial. Such unfairness exists when a coerced confession is used as a means of
obtaining a verdict of guilt. We have so held in every instance in which we have set aside for want of due
process a conviction based on a confession.”). Involuntary confessions are considered inherently untrustworthy.
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 316 (1959) (“Life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal
[police] methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.”).
100. Spano, 360 U.S. at 315 (“[P]etitioner’s will was overborne by official pressure, fatigue and
sympathy falsely aroused; his confession was not voluntary; and its admission in evidence violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
101. See WEAVER, supra note 96, at 178.
102. See e.g., Ashcroft v. Tennessee 322 U.S. 143, 143, 154 (1944) (finding an interrogation involuntary
because police questioned defendant for thirty-six consecutive hours).
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In its leading case on the matter, Spano v. New York, the Supreme Court
looked to the following facts in finding an involuntary confession: the twentyfive-year old defendant was born outside of the United States, was only in his
104
first year of high school, and had a history of emotional instability. In addition,
he was questioned by multiple officers for eights hours—during which he was
told his failure to confess would lead to his longtime friend losing his job as a
105
police officer —and was subject to “the leading questions of a skillful
106
prosecutor.”
Amanda Knox, though younger than the defendant in Spano, has long
107
excelled in school, and those who know her consider her bright and motivated.
108
She also has had plenty of work and life experience for someone her age.
Unlike the defendant in Spano, she has no known history of mental illness or
emotional instability. On the night of November 5th, Knox came to the police
109
station voluntarily, not because of an outstanding warrant against her like the
110
defendant in Spano. When police asked to speak with Knox, they did not
inform her that they considered her a suspect, nor that Sollecito had recanted his
111
statements that Knox had been with him the entire night of Kercher’s murder.
Both of these statements would have increased Knox’s sense that she had to
cooperate with the officers’ request that she speak to them.
Knox also claimed that she was not fed by officers, was hit on the head twice
by an unidentified police officer, was told she would never see her family again,
112
and that obtaining a lawyer would not be in her best interest. However, there
was conflicting testimony on this, and Knox could not even identify which
113
officer hit her. US courts often have to resolve disputes of conflicting

103. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
104. Id. at 321–22.
105. Id. at 322.
106. Id.
107. See BURLEIGH, THE FATAL GIFT OF BEAUTY, supra note 2, at 50–53 (referring to Amanda as
“scholarship smart,” noting that she organized and worked to send herself to study in Italy).
108. See BURLEIGH, THE FATAL GIFT OF BEAUTY, supra note 2, at 52.
109. Exclusive: Amanda Knox Statement, CBSNEWS (Dec. 4, 2009, 8:52 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/
8301-18559_162-4936228.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
110. 360 U.S. at 323.
111. See Nadeau, The Italian Job, supra note 75 (stating that after Sollecito changed his story the police
asked Knox only if they could ask her a few questions); see also Exclusive: Amanda Knox Statement, supra
note 109 (relaying Knox’s statement to the judge that police came into the waiting room, only telling her they
wanted to ask her more questions about what she knew and who came to her house).
112. Nikki Batiste & Alyssa Newcomb, Amanda Knox ‘Loves Italy’ and May Go Back, ABCNEWS (Jan.
24, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/International/amanda-knox-love-italy-return/story?id=15429853#.UOXz
BY4ctUQ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
113. Doug Longhini & Sara Ely, Raffaele Sollecito Says He was Slapped During Interrogation by Italian
Police, CBSNEWS (Sept. 27, 2012, 12:47 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57520846-5040
83/raffaele-sollecito-says-he-was-slapped-during-interrogation-by-italian-police/ (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (stating that police denied Knox’s claims of abuse and filed criminal slander charges against her).
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114

testimony, and usually they credit the police. Therefore, the facts of Knox’s
case are not analogous to those of Spano, and weigh in favor of a finding of
voluntariness.
The only uncontroverted factor supporting a hypothetical claim of
involuntariness is that her interview took place late at night and lasted for several
hours, after police had already questioned her for three consecutive days—and as
115
a result of this and the murder she had not been sleeping well. However, the
length of questioning, approximately four hours, was far short of the thirty-six
116
consecutive hours of questioning present in Ashcroft v. State of Tennessee,
117
(which was deemed sufficient alone to render the interview involuntary ), as
well as the eight hour questioning in Spano (which, as already discussed, had
many other factors supporting the finding of involuntariness). Thus, an American
court could rationally conclude, in light of Spano and Lisenba, that Knox’s
statement was voluntary. While, on appeal, the conclusion of voluntariness is
118
reviewed de novo, an appellate court, based on this entire record, likely would
affirm the voluntariness finding.
ii. Inadmissibility of the Statement Due to a Miranda Violation
119

In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court ruled that police must offer
adequate protective devices to suspects in custody, otherwise “no statement
120
obtained from a defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.” These
protective devices include informing an interrogated person in custody that she
has the right to remain silent (and that anything she says can be used against her
in court) and the right to an attorney (or to have one appointed for her if she
121
cannot afford her own). After these warnings are given, the defendant “may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or

114. In fact, many critics claim that “police perjury” is an epidemic in the American criminal court
system, one that is tacitly perpetuated by judicial inaction. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Controlling the Cops;
Accomplices to Perjury, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/02/opinion/controllingthe-cops-accomplices-to-perjury.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Without the complicity of
judges, police perjury would be reduced considerably. I have seen trial judges pretend to believe officers whose
testimony is contradicted by common sense, documentary evidence and even unambiguous tape recordings. . . .
Some judges refuse to close their eyes to perjury, but they are the rare exception to the rule of blindness,
deafness and muteness that guides the vast majority of judges and prosecutors.”).
115. See generally Exclusive: Amanda Knox Statement, supra note 107 (providing the transcript of
Knox’s statements to Judge Paulo Micheli during the trial of Rudy Guede).
116. 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
117. Id. at 154.
118. See U.S. v. Mills, 122 F.3d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 1997) (determining on remand—after instruction from
the Supreme Court—that voluntariness receives de novo review).
119. 384 U.S. 436 (1996).
120. Id. at 458.
121. Id. at 444–45.
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make a statement.” Generally, any statements taken in violation of Miranda
123
result in the exclusion of such evidence. However, there are exceptions to
Miranda. For example, statements taken in violation of a defendant’s Miranda
124
rights can still be used to impeach the defendant if she testifies.
Before considering whether the state can evoke an exception to Miranda, the
court must determine whether the defendant was in custody. While these
protections may appear both clear and far-reaching on the surface, the legal
definition of “custody” can limit Miranda’s protections. While the test to
determine custody has developed over time, the modern test looks to whether a
reasonable person would feel “he or she was not at liberty to terminate the
125
interrogation and leave.” The court will look to all of the circumstances of the
interrogation to see whether there is either a formal arrest or a restriction of free
126
movement comparable to formal arrest. Not every questioning at a police
127
128
station triggers the need for Miranda warnings. In Oregon v. Mathiason, the
Court found that a defendant invited to come to the station by police did so
voluntarily; therefore, Miranda warnings were not triggered (even though the
129
defendant was later arrested for his incriminating statements).
If the same factual scenario of Knox’s November 2nd confession had
unfolded at an American police station, there are multiple ways the statement
could have eventually found its way into an American courtroom. Knox gave her
130
statement at the police station in an interrogation room. The fact that the police
were asking her questions at the police station is enough to establish that the
131
interrogation requirement was met. However, as stated above, questioning at a
132
police station is not enough to establish custody. In fact, this situation is similar
to that of Mathiason. The police did not request that Knox even come to the
133
police station; she came upon her own accord. Once there, she was asked to

122. Id. at 479.
123. See Id. at 476 (“The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion
today are . . . prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant.”).
124. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).
125. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 100 (1995).
126. See WEAVER, supra note 96, at 191.
127. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477–78.
128. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
129. Id. at 495.
130. See Exclusive: Amanda Knox Statement, supra note 109 (relating Knox’s statements to the judge that
police moved her from the waiting room to another room to ask questions).
131. Nevertheless, interrogation may not even matter if custody, as discussed above, was not found first.
“The Court often seems to view ‘custody’ and ‘interrogation’ as separate requirements, deciding the ‘custody’
issue first and then, only if the suspect was in custody, addressing the interrogation issue.” JOSHUA DRESSLER &
GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATING CRIME 665 (4th ed. 2010).
132. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 (finding defendant was not in custody, even though questioning took
place at police station).
133. See Exclusive: Amanda Knox Statement, supra note 109.
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speak with them and agreed to. By Knox’s own admission, she wanted to
135
continue speaking to police to assist them in their hunt for Kercher’s murderer.
Thus far, she had spoken with police for this purpose on multiple prior occasions,
and each time police allowed her to return home. An American court could find
that there was no reason for Knox to suspect that this round of questioning would
be any different—especially as it was not she who the police called in, but rather
Sollecito.
Despite these facts indicating that “custody” might not exist, admittedly at
some point a reasonable person in Knox’s situation likely would have felt she
could not leave the interrogation room. Knox’s testimony about the length and
136
intensive tactics used during the questioning supports this assumption. The
question remains at what point the police would have needed to issue Miranda
warnings if this same situation had occurred in an American system. Likely, they
would not have been required to do so until they viewed Knox as a suspect, that
is, when they informed her that Sollecito had destroyed her alibi and began
requesting that she tell them a different story than the one she had been relaying
to them.
After this, a court would likely find that the custody and interrogation
requirements were satisfied in order to trigger the American system’s Miranda
warning requirement. Yet, there are several indicators that Knox would have
received these warnings. The Italian police officers believed they had caught the
137
culprit of perhaps the most high-profile murder to ever disturb their city. They
138
were extremely careful in preserving her sudden and complete “confession.”
Likewise, had such a high-profile murder occurred in an American city, it seems
unlikely that police officers would not have read her the warnings, especially
139
when she offered to write and sign her new, complete confession. Nearly half a
century after the Miranda decision, reading Miranda warnings is a thoroughly
140
embedded practice in police procedure. The United States Supreme Court has
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Batiste & Necomb, supra note 110 (relaying Knox’s accusations that police abused her
physically and verbally); Nadeau, The Italian Job, supra note 73.
137. Lumumba: The Popular and Gentle Bar Owner Willing to Help Anyone, THE DAILY MAIL (last
updated, Nov. 7, 2007, 11:29), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-492165/Lumumba-The-popular-gentlebar-owner-willing-help-anyone.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (referring to the murder as the
“the most shocking murder in the town’s memory . . .”).
138. After Knox made an oral confession police wrote out a statement reflecting this and asked her to
sign it. See BURLEIGH, supra note 2, at 196–98. They called in the Perugian magistrate in charge of
investigating and prosecuting the Kercher murder, Giuliano Mignini, who also had Knox sign a statement. Id. at
197. The entire thiry-six member police force of Perugia was called in “to sign the arrest document.” Id. at 198.
Knox herself later offered to write a statement and sign it. Id. at 199.
139. Id. at 197–99.
140. See Carl A. Benoit, J.D., The “Public Safety” Exception to Miranda, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/
publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/february2011/legal_digest (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
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even stated that “Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the
141
point where the warnings have become part of our national culture.”
Even if our hypothetical American officers had given the warnings after
Knox’s initial oral statements placing her at the scene of the crime and accusing
Lumumba of the act, the written statement following the warnings may still have
been admissible. When the same statements are made both pre- and postMiranda warnings, the court will find the second statement admissible unless
142
there is a showing of bad faith. Knox suddenly and completely changed her
story, confessing to playing a role in the murder. While the police may have
suspected this, they had no idea that she would actually give such a confession,
or that she would give them Lumumba’s name as the murderer, and so it is
unlikely that the police in this situation would be found to have purposefully
avoided giving the warnings.
In addition to facts suggesting that Miranda warnings would have been given
to Knox had she been questioned in an American police station, there are also
indications that Knox would have waived her Miranda rights once they were
given. An overwhelming majority of suspects, 80–90 percent, waive their rights
143
after being Mirandized. Additionally, Knox willingly confessed to police; and
while she admitted to being unclear as to some of the details, the one thing she
was certain of was that she wanted to explain herself, explain the truth, and to
144
assist the police in finding Meredith’s murderer. This is exactly what she
attempted to do by her statement.
Finally, even if Miranda applied and police for some reason failed to give the
145
warning, the statement could have still been used for impeachment purposes. In
such a case, the evidence would have been inadmissible—because of the
Miranda violation—in the American court for one purpose (the truth of the
”

(“[T]he the Miranda decision stands as a monolith in police procedure. ).
141. Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
142. In Missouri v. Seibert, a plurality of the Court ruled that where the officer purposefully obtains the
confession without Miranda warnings, then follows the confession with the warnings, and immediately asks the
suspect to repeat the earlier confession, that Miranda is not complied with. 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (plurality
decision). However, in Oregon v. Elstad, the Court allowed this practice where it was employed as a purposeful
tactic. 470 U.S. 298, 301 (1985). In that case, the officer, upon arresting the young defendant in the presence of
his mother, stated that he believed the defendant was involved in a burglary. Id. The defendant responded that
he had been at the scene. Id. Later, he made full confession at the police house after being Mirandized. Id. In
Seibert, the Court distinguished Elstad as a “good-faith” Miranda mistake. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 600. Here,
Knox’s situation aligns much more closely with Elstad. The police did not even plan on questioning Knox at all
that evening, let alone as a suspect. Moreover, they clearly had no idea about the Lumumba theory of the
murder (or they would have arrested him already).
143. DAVID LEVINSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 930 (Vol. 1 2002).
144. In her statement, Knox wrote: “I . . . want to tell the truth the best that I can . . .” and “I understand
how serious this situation is, and as such, I want to give you this information as soon and as clearly as possible.”
Malcolm Moore, Transcript of Amanda Knox’s Note, THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 22, 2007, 1:14 PM), http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1570225/Transcript-of-Amanda-Knoxs-note.html (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
145. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).
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matter asserted) but admissible for another (impeachment of Knox). This would
then mirror the criticized result in the Italian court, where the statement was
inadmissible for the purpose of the criminal suit but admissible for purposes of
147
the defamation claim against Knox.
Most inquisitorial systems, like the Italian system, do not have evidence
148
codes with strict rules limiting the information that a jury may hear. That is
149
because the jury is composed of both lay people and judges. During
150
deliberations, the judges explain the proper weight of the evidence. The
appellate court can determine whether the fact-finders made improper use of the
evidence by reading the detailed opinion that the jury must prepare justifying the
151
verdict. For example, the trial court in the Knox case submitted a four hundred152
page report. This safeguard does not exist in the U.S., as its system requires
153
juries only to announce the verdict. In the American system, there is no written
assurance that the jury will read the statement only as proof of Knox’s conflicting
testimony on the stand (and thus her lack of credibility as a witness) rather than
considering the truth of the statement itself.
The analysis of voluntariness and Miranda warnings demonstrates that the
trial court may have found her statement admissible because it was voluntary;
and, furthermore, that if Miranda warnings were required there is good reason to
think they would have been given and that Knox would have waived them. Or, at
the very least, that the prosecution would have used the statement for
impeachment purposes. Thus, unlike in the Italian criminal court where the
statement was virtually per se inadmissible (and was ruled so by the Italian
154
judge), there are multiple paths by which the statement could have found its
way into an American criminal trial. Moreover, the exclusion of Knox’s
statement in the Italian criminal trial was the result of the Italian procedural
146. Id.; FED. R. EVID. 105.
147. Hooper, Was There a Plot to Murder Meredith?, supra note 47.
148. Criminal Procedure: Comparative Aspects-Adjudication JRANK.ORG, http://law.jrank.org/
pages/901/Criminal-Procedure-Comparative-Aspects-Adjudication.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2013) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (“In inquisitorial systems, the court has complete freedom in evaluating the
evidence.”); Dough Saunders, Amanda Knox & Dominique Strauss Kahn Reveal A Continental Divide over
Courts, DOUGSAUNDERS.NET (Oct. 4, 2011), http://dougsaunders.net/2011/10/amanda-knox-dominique-strausskahn-reveal-continental-divide-courts/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
149. See Mirabella, supra note 58, at 236.
150. Id.
151. William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The Difficulties of
Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 15 (1992).
152. Tom Kington, Meredith Kercher Has Been Forgotten, Says Family, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2011,
12:18), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/03/meredith-kercher-forgotten-says-family (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
153. See PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS, AM. BAR ASS’N 22 (2005), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/juryprojectstandards/principles.authcheckdam.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (noting that an informal poll may be conducted to determine how each juror will voted
but stating nothing about requiring an opinion).
154. See Donadio, supra note 1.
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requirement that a suspect be given a lawyer and translator immediately upon
155
questioning. In the American system, an uncharged suspect does not receive the
156
right to an attorney unless and until Miranda protections are triggered. Thus,
the Italian criminal system’s protections activate earlier than the American
system’s and offer more certain protections for defendants. This fact makes the
criticisms of the Italian criminal system seem biased and poorly directed, at least
in so far as the critics position the American system as a superior example.
B. Admission of Character Evidence Against Knox
Many critics found the admission of character evidence against Knox to be
157
the most incriminatory and consequently unfair aspect of the trial. The
158
prosecution introduced posts from Knox’s MySpace and Facebook pages.
Among these were Knox’s references to herself as “Foxy-Knoxy”—which
became the Italian media’s moniker for the sexy and deviant characterization of
159
Knox it fostered. The prosecution strengthened the nickname with pictures of
160
Knox with a Gatling gun and a drunken video post of her with friends. This
characterization, according to Knox supporters, allowed the prosecutor to create a
“fictional . . . satanic, ritualistic sex crazed killer,” allowing the jury to convict
161
her based on this image alone. The court also admitted two short stories,
written by Knox, dealing with “rapes, self-cutting, voyeurism, and domestic
violence,” which have been described as “an intense, detailed description of the
162
physical sensation of suppressed rage.”
In addition to Internet sources, the prosecution put Kercher’s friends on the
stand to paint a picture of Knox as so overtly sexual that she made Kercher

155. Mirabella, supra note 58, at 242 n.79.
156. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1996) (listing right to counsel among the due process
protections afforded to an interrogated defendant in custody).
157. See Steph Stradley, The Amanda Knox Case: Character Assassination Versus Evidence, STRADLEY
LAW, http://www.stradleylaw.com/the-amanda-knox-case-character-assassination-versus-evidence/ (last visited
Jan. 3, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (summarizing and seconding the American news media’s
criticisms that the prosecution rested its case on “character assassination . . .”).
158. Hooper, Was There a Plot to Murder Meredith?, supra note 47. Similar evidence was introduced
against Sollecito from his blog sites. Id. One especially damaging image was a picture of Sollecito dressed in
surgical bandages “wielding a meat cleaver.” Id.
159. FISHER, supra note 12, at 48. Knox and her family stated that the nickname, rather than being a
promiscuous one, was given to her when she was eight “for her sly moves on the soccer field.” Id.
160. Fisher, Italian Murder Puts American Student in Spotlight, supra note 40.
161. FISHER, supra note 12, at 48.
162. BURLEIGH, THE FATAL GIFT OF BEAUTY, supra note 2, at 60. The first story was of a rapist. Id. at
61. The rapist states at one point, “A thing you have to know about chicks is that they don’t know what they
want.” Id. The second story was about a young girl involved in a “triangle with her mother . . . and the mother’s
ex-boyfriend . . . who stalks them and secretly snaps pictures of them while they are asleep and who may have
raped [the girl].” Id.
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163

uncomfortable in her own home. They claimed that Kercher and Knox argued
about this, as well as Knox’s lack of cleanliness, the men she brought to the
164
apartment, and money that had disappeared from Kercher’s room. Friends
present after the murder stated that Knox was “strangely unaffected by the
165
murder. . . .” One witness testified that she “‘found it difficult to be with
166
[Knox] because she showed no emotion when everyone was really upset.’”
Anne Bremner, an American attorney who is the spokeswoman for Friends
of Amanda (a Knox support group) and Knox’s pro bono counsel, stated that this
“character assassination” gave the defense an “uphill battle” before the
167
unsequestered jury. Columbia University Cardozo Professor of Law George P.
Fletcher gave the following critique:
In the United States, character evidence does not come into play in the
trial unless the defendant puts it in play. The prosecution can’t come into
court and say my guy is a bad guy. In this case, even if there is a sexual
motive, so what if, say, she had a dozen boyfriends? That is not relevant
168
here.
However, as the following comparison will demonstrate, the American rules
169
regarding character evidence are not as absolute as Fletcher asserts. Though it
163. See generally NADEAU, ANGEL FACE, supra note 28, at 127–30 (describing testimony by Kercher’s
friends claiming that Knox’s sexual character made Kercher uncomfortable). Meredith’s friends testified that,
“Meredith complained that [Amanda] brought men back to the house. . . . This was something we didn’t do, but
Amanda was quite open about her sex life.” Id. at 127. Others explained how Amanda left her vibrator out,
making Kercher uncomfortable. Id.
164. Italian Court Gives Briton Murderers Long Sentences, THE EPOCH TIMES (Dec. 5, 2009),
http://m.theepochtimes.com/n2/united-kingdom/perugia-murder-trial-26066.html (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review); Wise & Battiste, supra note 38.
165. NADEAU, ANGEL FACE, supra note 28, at 128.
166. Id. (quoting witness Robyn Butterworth). Critics grouped these statements of Knox’s reactions after
Meredith was discovered murdered as “character evidence,” however this evidence is not character evidence
and would be generally admissible as relevant evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402. Rule 402
admits all relevant evidence, unless it falls into another exception. FED. R. EVID. 402. Rule 401 broadly
describes “relevant” as encompassing any evidence that “has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Id. at 401.
Here, this observation by a witness tends to prove a number of important facts, for example, that Knox was not
surprised by the murder or that she was not upset by the murder, both of which could go toward proving motive
or consciousness or guilt.
167. Tiffany Sharples, How Strong is the Evidence Against Amanda Knox?, TIME (June 14, 2009),
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/ 0,8599,1904571,00.hml (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
168. Robbins, An American in the Italian Wheels of Justice, supra note 9 (quoting George P. Fletcher).
169. American news outlets quickly picked up on these absolute statements regarding character evidence.
For example, as one author from the Seattle Weekly stated, “[w]ith an utter lack of physical evidence tying
Knox and Sollecito to the murder, prosecutors instead attacked her character.” He argued the prosecution used
“all manner of colorful terms, each of which had no legal merit . . . [and] would never fly in an American
court.” Curtis Cartier, Top Ten Reasons Amanda Knox’s Conviction was Overturned, SEATTLE WEEKLY (Oct.
3, 2011, 11:47 AM), http://blogs.seattleweekly.com/dailyweekly/2011/10/top_10_reasons_amanda_knoxs_co.
php (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (emphasis added).
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is true the admission of character evidence presented during the Knox trial in the
Italian court was the norm, while the admission in the American court would
likely stem from an exception of the rules, the fact remains that the same
admission could have occurred in an American court.
1. Admissibility of Character Evidence in the Italian Criminal System
Compared to the American adversarial system, the Italian system, as an
170
Inquisitorial system, has traditionally followed much broader, less restrictive
171
rules for evidence considered prejudicial to the defendant. Its system believes
172
the fact-finder capable of determining the credibility of relevant evidence. The
judge considers whether the evidence has probative value, and if so, will likely
173
allow it. Italy’s Criminal Procedure Code was rewritten in 1989, partially to
reflect a more adversarial system, and has since implemented exclusionary rules
in certain instances, “such as illegally seized documents and testimonial
174
evidence.”
However, the Italian system by no means abandoned the
Inquisitorial system’s tradition of trusting the court as one seeking truth. Thus, its
exclusionary rules exist only to forbid fact-finders from using the evidence in
reaching their verdict, not from hearing the evidence during the process of truth175
seeking. The system relies on the fact that the two judges sitting on the jury
panel will guide the jury in the proper method for understanding and weighing
176
the evidence in its decisions. Moreover, because the system also requires that
the jury write an opinion detailing its reasons for the verdict, proper reliance can
177
be demonstrated. Though the American system does not hail from the
Inquisitorial tradition, its rules are not inflexible when it comes to character
evidence.
2. Admissibility of Character Evidence in the American Criminal System
The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) prohibit introducing evidence of a
person’s character to “prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in
178
accordance with the character or trait.” This rule also applies to the use of past

170. See Mirabella, supra note 58, at 233 (describing the traditional Italian inquisitorial system and its
recent adversarial additions).
171. Id. at 251.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. (“Italian jurists feel that the mixed jury is capable of knowing about the existence of evidence
without making use of that evidence in the deliberation.”).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 236.
178. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
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“crimes, wrongs, or other acts” as evidence that the defendant acted in
179
accordance with her character. The critics have latched onto this general rule.
However, as anyone involved in the American legal field knows, for every given
rule there are many more exceptions to that rule. Also, as already stated, evidence
180
inadmissible for one purpose but admissible for another, is admissible.
The Fletcher criticism above notes one possible exception, that evidence of a
defendant’s relevant character trait is admissible if the defendant first introduces
181
evidence on this trait. Obviously, one cannot definitively say whether Knox
would have first introduced evidence of her good character; however, her
counsel’s statement above (made before trial), regarding the character
assassination of her client, indicates her legal team believed it was an issue from
182
the onset of the trial that they needed to address in order to win the case. Giulia
Bongiorno, another of Knox’s attorneys, echoed this belief, stating that
Amanda’s “image was massacred” by the media and that its attack on her
183
character started before the trial. In her closing remarks on appeal, Bongiorno
184
stated, “Knox is not the character the media has painted her to be.” The fact
that she accused the media—rather than the prosecution—for its depiction of
Knox’s character further underlines that the defense team believed throughout
that it was the media’s statements that mattered most. Indeed, most of the
prosecution’s character portrayals of Knox had already circulated the Italian
media circuit for over a year before being heard in the Italian courtroom. The
Italian (and global) media’s rampage against Amanda’s character had been in full
force not only in Italy, but also in America for months before the trial; thus,
regardless of an instruction ordering the jury not to read about the proceedings,
an American defense team would have faced the same media “character
185
assassination” issue as the Italian defense team did. As a result, the defense
may have felt pressed to repair Knox’s character through its own evidence.
179. Id. at 404(b).
180. Id. at 105.
181. Id. at 404(a)(2)(A).
182. See Sharples, supra note 166.
183. Amanda Knox Lawyers Make Final Arguments, CNN (Sept. 29, 2011, 1:31 PM), http://www.cnn.
com/2011/ 09/29/world/europe/italy-knox-appeal (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. The American media has its own history of criticized involvement in murder trials, especially when
the victim or the alleged murderer is an attractive young female (as with the Amanda Knox case). Consider the
OJ Simpson trial, as Harvard law professor Charles J. Ogletree Jr. states, “[t]he most disappointing aspect of
this entire trial to me was the role of the media. The press went at this case like a bee going after honey. They
were just obsessed with it to the point that facts didn’t matter; tainting evidence didn’t matter; undermining the
criminal justice system didn’t matter.” Frontline, The O.J. Verdict, PBS (Oct. 4, 2005), http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/oj/themes/media.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter Frontline].
Some consider the OJ Simpson trial as creating a new norm. Alan Dershowitz, member of the Simpson
defense team and Harvard law professor explains,
“I think after the O.J. Simpson case, the media realized it was on to something that Americans love:
trials of celebrities. If [you’re] not a celebrity, we’ll make you a celebrity. The Scott Peterson case—
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If so, the prosecution then would have been free to offer its evidence against
the defense’s evidence of Knox’s good character. Its evidence could take
multiple forms under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The prosecution could have
put on witnesses testifying to either Knox’s reputation or their opinions of Knox
(depending on which of these Knox presented on her behalf in her case-in186
chief). During the actual Italian trial, Knox’s team presented opinion and
reputation witnesses to demonstrate that there was “no basis for the sleazy tabloid
narrative that instantly superglued itself to” Knox, but rather that she was a “nice
girl from Seattle,” hardworking, “studious,” and friendly, with “[n]o violent
187
background.”
In response, the prosecution could have presented opinion and reputation
188
witnesses rebutting the same traits. For example, the testimony by Knox’s boss
that he had to remind her “to take care of the customers” and that he was
189
planning on firing Amanda could easily translate to his opinion that she was not
hardworking. Meredith’s friends testified that Amanda was a wild partier, equally
easy to translate into not “studious.”
However, it is not even necessary to turn their statements into pure “opinion
190
statements,” for specific instances of Knox’s character could have also been
191
admitted through cross-examination of her own good character witnesses.
Under this theory, the defense could impeach the truthfulness of Knox’s
witnesses. For example, when her college friend Madison Paxton stated that
Knox was hardworking, the defense could impeach Paxton’s truthfulness by
asking whether she knew that Knox’s boss intended to fire her for failure to
192
perform her duties. While it is true that if Paxton denied this, the defense could

he wasn’t a celebrity; he became a celebrity. And I think media-driven trials have now become a
reality. You get to be tried both in the court of public opinion, by the talking heads on television, and
you get to be tried in front of the jurors. The danger is that the jurors will be influenced by the
talking heads and by the media coverage and that tactical decisions will be made by lawyers and by
judges based on the media focus on the case. And that can be a great danger.”
Id. (emphasis added).
186. FED. R. EVID. 405(a). The prosecution would need to demonstrate that these witnesses had the
proper knowledge to testify to either of these matters. For a reputation witness, the prosecution must
demonstrate that the witness and the defendant are from the same community, that the witness has been a
member of that community for a certain length of time, that the defendant has a reputation for this character
trait, and that the witness knows of that reputation. For an opinion witness, all that is required is to show the
witness has known the defendant for a sufficiently long period of time. This time period varies; less time is
required if the relationship is of a close nature. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 477–78 (1948).
187. Dennis Murphy, The Trial of Amanda Knox: After Yearlong Trial in the Murder of a Housemate,
American Gets a Verdict, NBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2009), http://www.king5.com/news/investigators/60680637.html
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (transcript of Dateline NBC report, aired Dec. 4, 2009) (quoting Anne
Bremner).
188. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A).
189. Murphy, supra note 187.
190. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
191. FED. R. EVID. 405(a).
192. See Lind Byran, Investigators: Family, Friends Defend Amanda Knox’s Character, KING5 (Nov. 13,
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193

not put Lumumba on the stand to counter her denial, this is hardly necessary.
The question itself brings in the information and regardless of Paxton’s answer,
the result is a bad one for the defense: if Paxton answers no, the jury questions
whether she truly knows Amanda well enough to testify to her character; if
Paxton answers yes, it discredits Paxton’s testimony.
While under this theory of impeachment, the jury is told only to consider the
information for purposes of determining the credibility of Knox’s character
witness, almost every trial attorney will attest to the widely-held doubt that juries
in the American criminal system are capable of hearing evidence for one purpose
194
but not for another. As Dr. Joel Lieberman, an expert researcher and professor
in the area of jury decisionmaking, states, “[w]ith few exceptions, empirical
research has repeatedly demonstrated that limiting instructions” explaining to
jurors that they are only to use evidence for one purpose “are unsuccessful at
195
controlling jurors’ cognitive processes.”
Thus, this circumstance is quite similar to the Italian system’s handling of the
admission—where character evidence is admitted only to be heard but not to
form the jury’s verdict (that is, they cannot list it in the written opinion as reason
196
for the verdict). The difference lies in each system’s safeguard against the
jury’s improper use of the prejudicial evidence. The American system provides a
jury instruction; however, as noted above, the effectiveness of these instructions
197
is demonstrably low. The Italian system, on the other hand, requires a written
explanation for the decision that can be reviewed by an appellate court, forcing
the jury to prove it truly considered the evidence in its proper, limited light when
198
reaching its decision.

2009, 12:16 PM) http://www.king5.com/news/investigators/60680637.html (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (interviewing Madison Paxton); Murphy, supra note 187 (citing Patrick Lumumba’s interview with
NBC).
193. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 479 (1948) (stating a “hazard” the defendant faces is that
“his own witness is subject to cross-examination as to the contents and extent of the hearsay on which he bases
his conclusions, and he may be required to disclose rumors and reports that are current even if they do not affect
his own conclusion”).
194. Joel D. Liberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions, 6 J. OF
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 677, 678, 686 (2000). For recent studies demonstrating this See generally Jennifer
S. Hunt & Thomas Lee Budesheim, How Jurors Use and Misuse Character Evidence, 89 J. OF APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 2 (2004) (detailing their studies showing negative character evidence increases juror impressions of
guilt, despite instructions that the evidence is limited-use evidence only).
195. See Liberman & Arndt, supra note 194.
196. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
197. See Liberman & Arndt, supra note 194, at 678. “[A] large body of research indicates that jurors have
great difficulty ignoring information once they have become aware of it. Several social psychological theories
offer potential explanations as to why jurors are unable to ignore inadmissible information and why they
sometimes pay greater attention to this evidence when an admonition is given than when a judge says nothing at
all.” Id. This tendency is known as the “backfire effect.” Id. at 689.
198. Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 151, at 14–15. In addition to their verdict, the two judge and six jurors
issued a four hundred-page document giving the reasons for the conviction. Kington, Meredith Kercher Has
Been Forgotten, Says Family, supra note 152. The American procedural system not only does not require a
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Even if Knox’s legal team did not put her character in issue—though the
statements by her attorneys strongly indicate they would have—at least some of
the evidence could have also come in under another exception. While FRE
404(b) prohibits the use of past crimes, wrongs, or acts by the defendant to
demonstrate that the defendant acted in conformity with her character, it does
allow this evidence for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or lack of
199
200
accident. This list, stated in the rule, is “illustrative rather than exhaustive,”
201
meaning that it is not restrictive; the only limit is relevance. The motive for the
murder, according to the prosecution’s case, came from the disagreements
202
between Kercher and Knox. Thus, the testimony of Kercher and Knox’s
disagreements over Knox’s sexuality and many sexual partners, her lack of
cleanliness, and money could have been admitted to demonstrate motive. At trial,
the prosecution developed this revenge theory so far as to speculate Knox’s last
words to Kercher: “She probably said, ‘[y]ou are always behaving like a little
203
saint. Now we will show you, and now we will make you have sex!’” As
former prosecutor and reporter for Newsweek, Barbie Nadeau (who was present
for the prosecution’s case) reported, the theory was one of “[d]rugs fueling a
violent payback: Amanda getting even with the roommate who nagged her about
her drug use and the strange men she brought home. Amanda losing it in her
204
rage.” This evidence would also be limited in that the jury would be told only
to consider it for the purpose of demonstrating motive, not for its truth, but as
stated above, the likelihood that the jury does so, or is even capable of doing so,
is highly unlikely.
One final hurdle the evidence of Knox’s past bad acts would need to
overcome in the American system would be the requirement that the probative
value of the evidence not be substantially outweighed by the danger of “unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or considerations of
205
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
While there is no arguing that this evidence does not raise a risk of unfair
prejudice against Knox, the question is: would it be enough to substantially
written opinion, but “[u]pon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict,” does not allow any evidence “to show the
effect of any statement, conduct, event, or condition upon the mind of a juror or concerning the mental
processes by which the verdict was determined.” PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS, supra note 153, at
24. Thus, it essentially bans the safeguarding the Italian system requires.
199. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2).
200. JOHN E.B. MYERS, MYERS ON EVIDENCE, DOMESTIC, AND ELDER ABUSE CASES 677 (Vol 1. 2005).
201. Id.
202. See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
203. Burleigh, Amanda Knox Trial Moves Toward Climax, supra note 39.
204. See Wise & Battiste, supra note 38 (quoting Prosecutor Mignini’s theory during trial that “[t]here
could have been an argument between Meredith and Amanda that then degenerated because of the rental money
that had disappeared or maybe Meredith was annoyed by the mere presence of Rudy. . . .”).
205. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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outweigh its probative value? The judge would consider the probative value of
the evidence, the importance of the fact to be proven, less discriminatory
alternative means for proving the point, whether the fact is disputed, and the
206
“degree to which a jury is likely to follow a limiting instruction.”
The prosecution in an American court could have argued that motive, while
not a technical element of the crime, was an incredibly important fact to be
proven, and that no less discriminatory evidence could replace this to
demonstrate Knox’s motive to seek revenge against Meredith in a deadly sex
game. The prosecution could argue that this is clearly a disputed fact that cannot
be ignored (as the defense claimed Knox was a young, peaceful, and kind woman
who considered the victim a friend), and that concerns over the jury misusing the
evidence could adequately be dissuaded by a limiting instruction. Thus, the
prosecution would have valid arguments to combat the defense’s claim that the
prejudicial value substantially outweighed the probative value of the above
evidence of character and past bad acts.
It is true, under either the impeachment or past bad acts theory, likely not all
of the evidence would be admitted. For example, the Facebook pictures and
Myspace posts, especially the picture with the gun and Knox’s stories detailing
the violent rapes of young women, likely would not have come in. However,
given that these images had already fueled the media’s portrayal of her as a “sex
crazed American,” and her own character witnesses feared their ability to
207
overcome it, it is hard not to question whether the jury—Italian or American—
208
had essentially viewed the “evidence” already. Even if we are to focus solely
on the trial (rather than the media backdrop against which the trial took place) as
the complete culprit in Knox’s character assassination, it is incorrect to say that
the American system simply would not allow anything of this sort to be admitted
against Knox. It is also incorrect to say that the American safeguard of jury
instructions would act as an effective protectant, especially when compared to the
209
Italian safeguard of a written jury opinion.

206. MYERS, supra note 199, at 680–82.
207. See Byran, supra note 191 (interviewing Knox’s college friends Ben Parker and Madison Paxton
before they testified as character witnesses in Knox’s trial).
208. See Frontline, supra note 184 (detailing the heavy role the American media plays in forming jurors’
opinions and quoting celebrity defense attorney and legal commentator, Mickey Sherman, predicting that the
American media’s “contamination of jurors—or as [he] like[s] to say, the media-ization of jurors—will
continue. . . .”).
209. See supra notes 193–97 and accompanying text (discussing research indicating that jury instructions
are ineffective devices for preventing the misuse of character evidence).
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IV. TRY, TRY AGAIN: THE ITALIAN APPEALS OF AMANDA KNOX IN AN
AMERICAN COURTROOM
A. Knox’s Intermediate-Level Appeal in the Italian Criminal System
210

The Italian Appeals system grants two automatic appeals. In the first
appeal, all evidence and testimony that the judge approves is completely retried
211
and reexamined. The second appeal is brought before the Italian Supreme
Court and runs much more like an appeal in the American system, as the court
only reviews procedure and application of the law rather than re-examining the
212
entire body of evidence. While the judge presiding over the first appeal in the
Knox case did not grant all of the defense’s requests, he did order the
prosecution’s crucial witness, Antonio Curatolo, to take the stand for requestioning and independent experts appointed by the court to reexamine DNA
213
evidence presented by the prosecution. In addition, the defense offered new
214
witnesses and questioned Rudy Guede in court for the first time.
During his reexamination by the judge, Curatolo proved unreliable and
inconsistent, stating that he was “certain” he saw Knox and Sollecito near the
scene of the murder on October 31st (the murder did not occur until November
215
216
1st). The independent experts found the DNA results inconclusive at best.
Guede’s testimony maintained that Knox and Sollecito were present at the
murder scene, but the defense produced five of Guede’s fellow inmates who
testified that he had told them Knox and Sollecito were not involved in the
217
murder of Meredith Kercher. The court acquitted Knox and Sollecito of the
218
murder of Meredith Kercher on October 3, 2011.
Despite the near constant criticism by American journalists and some of the
legal community up until that point in the trial, a telling lack of commentary on
219
the legal process followed Knox’s acquittal. Perhaps this silence reflected an
210. FISHER, supra note 12, at 2.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 9. This request for an independent review of the forensic evidence was denied by the trial
judge. Id.
214. Id. at 71, 73.
215. Id. at 43.
216. Id. at 82–83, 89–90.
217. Id. at 71–72.
218. Squires, Amanda Knox Freed After Jury Overturns Controversial Murder Verdict, supra note 67.
219. Media coverage instead focused solely on Knox’s emotional release and return to her family and
home in Seattle. See, i.e. Elisabetta Povoledo, Amanda Knox Freed After Appeal in Italian Court, NY TIMES,
Oct. 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/04/world/europe/amanda-knox-defends-herself-in-italiancourt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that upon hearing the news
“a deeply stressed Ms. Knox slumped in her chair and began to sob, before falling into the arms of one of her
lawyers. . .”); Emotional Pressure Eases as Knox Goes Free, MSNBC (Oct. 5, 2011, 6:46 AM), http://www.
nbcnews.com/id/44782652/ns/us_news-life/t/emotional-pressure-eases-knox-goes-free/ (on file with the
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understanding that Knox’s ultimate acquittal came because of the Italian system’s
de novo review of the case, which destroyed the prosecution’s DNA evidence
and eyewitness accounts placing Knox and Sollecito at the scene of the crime.
Furthermore, the silence may demonstrate comprehension that this detailed
review of trial evidence is a purposeful mechanism of the overall Italian system.
As Grace Mirabella states,
The detailed appellate review of the first Knox verdict must be viewed as
part of the plurality of voices the Italian justice system deems necessary
to provide fairness and determine the truth rather than as a separate and
220
distinct procedure from the first trial.
Or, as the next Section will demonstrate, perhaps this silence reflected an
even stronger realization: that the American system could not have overturned
Knox’s verdict because it would not hear such an appeal.
B. Knox’s Intermediate-Level Appeal in the American Criminal System
In the American criminal system, while the defendant has the right to appeal
a guilty verdict to the intermediate appellate court, she is not guaranteed an
221
appeal to the higher court, but instead must be granted one. The appellate court
222
looks for reversible error. While different standards govern what qualifies as
“reversible error,” it requires that the error had some substantial “injurious effect
223
or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” In making this decision, the
court will look only at the trial record; it will not “receive additional evidence or
224
hear witnesses.” The trial court largely reviews only legal error; it may review
factual findings “but typically may only overturn a decision on factual grounds if
225
the findings were ‘clearly erroneous.’”
For purposes of this comparison, the most important limitation on appealing
cases in the American criminal system is that appellate courts review issues of
226
law, not fact. A factual issue is one that confronts a factual finding made by the
McGeorge Law Review) (detailing Knox’s emotional reunion with her family).
220. Mirabella, supra note 58, at 254–55.
221. WEAVER, supra note 96, at 422.
222. Id. at 421.
223. United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,
777(1946).
224. The Appeals Process, Federal Courts, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/HowCourtsWork/TheAppealsProcess.aspx (last visited Dec. 26,
2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
225. Id.
226. MICHAEL R. FONTHAM, MICHAEL VITIELLO, & DAVID W. MILLER, PERSUASIVE WRITTEN AND
ORAL ADVOCACY IN TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS 266 (2007) (“Resolving factual disputes is uniquely
within the province of trial courts. . . . [A]ppellate courts . . . generally restrict the scope of review of factual
decisions.”).
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trial court. Appealing an issue of fact is “not a good issue on appeal unless the
228
ruling is unsupported” by any evidence.
Knox’s defense team appealed the evidentiary, factual findings regarding the
229
DNA evidence and the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses. The appellate
court reheard testimony of these witnesses and allowed retesting of the DNA
evidence, as well as testimony from the DNA experts who performed the
230
retesting. The court also heard from new witnesses not presented at trial: Rudy
231
Guede and prison inmates claiming to have spoken with Guede. All of these
appeals are ones of fact. And while the defense was able to discredit the
prosecution’s witness during the appeal and the DNA retesting proved
inconclusive, the initial testimony and DNA findings were neither “clearly
232
erroneous” nor unsupported by any evidence. Hence, an American appellate
court would almost certainly not have heard Knox’s appeal on these grounds and
233
could not have overturned her verdict.
Thus, in the context of this case, the Italian appeals system’s review of both
substance (fact) and procedure (law) seems far more “just.” In response to this
point, some Knox supporters have “stress[ed] the importance of getting it right
234
the first time instead of relying on the appeals courts to clean up the mess.”
Likewise, proponents of the American appellate system state, “[a] contest-based
adversarial system will naturally produce a procedural focus [on appeal],”
235
believing that the adversarial trial provided a fair contest and thus a fair result.
However, as law professor George C. Thomas states, the danger to this approach
236
is that “[a] procedural focus on appeal is indifferent to innocence.” It seems, at
the very least, ironic that the pro-Knox/anti-Italian system group—so concerned
with the innocence of Knox—should champion the adversarial system

227. Id.
228. Id.
229. FISHER, supra note 12, at 9.
230. Id. at 9, 82.
231. Id. at 71–73.
232. For example, the original DNA testing showed “Sollecito’s DNA on the clasp of [Kercher’s] bra,
Guede’s DNA on [Kercher’s] body, Knox’s DNA on the handle of a knife. Barbie Nadeau, Trial of the Century,
THE DAILY BEAST (Dec. 30, 2008, 7:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/12/30/trial-of-thecentury.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The same knife, which was found in Sollecito’s
apartment, [had] what could be Kercher’s DNA on the blade.” Id. The DNA findings were collaborated with
other evidence of “fingerprints, bloody Nike sneaker footprints and mixed blood droplets on a bathroom faucet
Kercher shared with Knox . . .” and the prosecution’s eyewitnesses, who claimed to have seen Knox and
Sollecito near the crime scene. Id. Thus, rather than being “clearly erroneous,” the original testing was
supported by a multitude of findings.
233. This is not to say that no possible valid appeal could exist if an American trial were to occur, but that
none of the appeals presented in the actual trial would have worked in an American appeals system.
234. FISHER, supra note 12, at 2.
235. GEORGE C. THOMAS III, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: HOW THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM
SACRIFICES INNOCENT DEFENDANTS, 214 (2008).
236. Id.
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(“indifferent to innocence” ) over the Italian inquisitorial system that eventually
acquitted her.
C. Knox’s High-Level Appeal in the Italian Criminal System
As this Article goes to print, the Knox case has come before two more courts:
238
the Italian high court (known as the Court of Cassation ) and the Italian appeals
court once again. As stated above, the Italian system grants two automatic
239
appeals. Knox’s initial appeal ended on October 3, 2011 with the overturning
240
of her guilty verdict. On March 25, 2013, Italy’s highest court heard the
241
prosecution’s argument to overturn the acquittal. The world watched as less
than twenty-four hours later the high court overturned Knox’s acquittal and
242
demanded a retrial. The high court explained its decision (which was based
243
solely on procedural error ) in a seventy-four-page opinion, criticizing the
244
appellate jury for “deficiencies, contradictions and illogical” conclusions.
245
Knox’s retrial began on September 30, 2013. The appeals court may affirm
Knox’s acquittal or find her guilty upon its review; this decision can then once
246
again be appealed to the high court.
The announcement of Knox’s retrial resulted in immediate blowback from
247
the American legal community and media. The headlines continue to ring with
accusations of double jeopardy—that is, that Knox’s retrial violates the
237. Id.
238. THE ITALIAN COURT SYSTEM, UNIDROIT 1, available at www.unidroit.info/mm/TheItalian
JudicialSystem.pdf (last visited July 25, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
239. See FISHER, supra note 12, at 2 (stating that Italy offers two automatic appeals).
240. Squires, Amanda Knox Freed After Jury Overturns Controversial Murder Verdict, supra note 67.
241. Frances D’emilio, Amanda Knox Trial: Italy’s Top Criminal Court Hears Appeal HUFFINGTON
POST, Mar. 25, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/25/amanda-knox-appeal-verdict-italy-court-ofcassation_n_2947605.html (on file with McGeorge Law Review).
242. Livia Borghese & Jason Hanna, Italian Court on Reason for Knox’s Retrial: Evidence Neglected,
CNN (July 19, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/18/world/europe/italy-amanda-knox-case/index.html (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
243. See supra note 211 (explaining that the second appeal reviews only procedural error).
244. Livia Borghese & Jason Hanna, supra note 241.
245. Amanda Knox Retrial Begins in Florence Sept. 30 After Italy’s High Court Overturned Acquittal,
STAR TRIBUNE, July 9, 2013, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/07/09/amanda-knox-retrial-begins-inflorence-sept-30-after-italy-high-court/#ixzz2a4pC22D5 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
246. Transcript: Supreme Court Examines Same-Sex Marriage; Italy to Retry Amanda Knox, ANDERSON
COOPER 360 DEGREES (aired March 26, 2013), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/
1303/26/acd.02.html [hereinafter Transcript] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
247. The following headlines provide a snapshot of the media response: Graham Wench, In Italy, Double
Jeopardy for Amanda Knox?, HLN (April 8, 2013), http://www.hlntv.com/article/2013/03/25/amanda-knoxdouble-jeopardy-retrial-innocent-or-guilty (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Mary Noble, Is Amanda
Knox Facing Double Jeopardy?, POLITIX (March 27, 2013), http://politix.topix.com/homepage/5308-isamanda-knox-facing-double-jeopardy (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Sharon Rice, Amanda Knox to
Face Double Jeopardy in Italy, DUQUESNE LAW BLOG (March 26, 2013), http://www.duqlawblogs.org/
duqcrim/2013/03/amanda-knox-to-face-double-jeopardy-in-italy/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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fundamental right for criminal defendants in the United States not to be tried for
248
the same crime twice.
As former professor of political science at Harvard University Edward Jay
Epstein stated,
[t]he revival of the baseless charges against Knox, and the tabloid frenzy
it will no doubt stoke, proceeds from a five-year-long judicial circus in
Italy…. The United States Constitution, under its double jeopardy
provisions, protects individuals from being retried for crimes of which
they have been acquitted. It would be a violation of Knox’s constitutional
rights as a United States citizen to return her to Italy to be tried again. It
would also, of course, be a travesty of justice for an Italian prosecutor to
use her case as a means to revive a [sic] his reputation, as an advocate of
249
Satanic and “she-devil” conspiracy theory.
Thus, in vehement terms, the American news outlets and legal community
have once again denounced the Italian criminal legal system as unjust (and
conspiracy-based), while at the same time glorifying the American system. Yet
again, their criticisms reflect misunderstanding of both the foreign legal system at
work and the domestic system they pit as its superior.
The Italian system grants two automatic appeals for both the prosecution and
250
the defense after trial. As former Italian prosecutor Barbie Nadeau explained to
news anchor Anderson Cooper,
Italy has a three-tier system in which there are really three levels to
every single criminal trial . . . . In the first case, the lower court makes a
decision. In this case, Amanda Knox and Raffaele Sollecito were
convicted of the murder. In the second level, which is a right by every
defendant to appeal their first conviction if it’s a conviction or for the
prosecutor to appeal an acquittal in that case, they were acquitted of the
murder of Meredith Kercher. No case is considered to be complete unless
and until it finishes that third level, the high court decision . . . . In fact,
it’s possible for these two levels, for the appellate level and the high
court level, to go back and forth as many as two or three times, if that’s
what is indicated by the evidence and by the way these trials go. So they
have basically sent it back. The trial is still within the same cycle of the
original trial, so she’s not being tried again for the same crime. Her

248. See U.S. CONST. art. V (granting the right for criminal defendants to be free from double jeopardy).
249. Edward Jay Epstein, The Amanda Knox Circus—Again, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (April 29, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ed-epstein/amanda-knox-italy_b_3174771.html (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
250. See FISHER, supra note 12, at 2 (stating that Italy offers two automatic appeals).
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original trial has not yet been completed under the Italian judicial
251
standard.
Knox’s own attorneys agree, admitting that “the high court’s decision does
not raise a double jeopardy problem because the retrial would not be a new case
252
but rather a continuation of the same case on appeal.” Thus, as a result of the
Italian dual automatic appeal system, the Knox case could continue for years.
While this might be a valid criticism of the system in and of itself, this is not the
criticism articulated by the US media and legal commentators. Moreover, it
seems hypocritical to criticize only those aspects of a foreign appellate system
that work against one’s compatriot. That is, the lack of criticism after Knox’s
initial acquittal, and the major celebrations upon her return, indicated that the
United States media/legal pundits had no complaints about the Italian appellate
system, which allowed an acquittal that could not have occurred in the American
253
system. And yet, now, two years later, the Italian appellate system is suddenly
inept and unjust.
The American critics not only misunderstand the Italian system, they also
misunderstand their own. First, and most importantly, the American criminal
system—even with its double jeopardy protection—does allow for a similar
procedural process to that of Knox’s Italian case. For example, a defendant can
be convicted of a crime at the trial court level. If this conviction is then
appealed—as Knox’s conviction was—the appellate court could overturn the
254
conviction for insufficient evidence. This would effectively dismiss the case.
However, the prosecution could still appeal the finding of insufficient evidence.
The high-level appellate court could then reverse the intermediate appellate
255
court’s finding of insufficient evidence, and the conviction would stand. No
double jeopardy violation would exist.
Despite the fact that this same procedural process could occur in the
American criminal system, commentators persist in arguing that if Knox is found

251. Transcript, supra note 246.
252. See Terry Baynes, Analysis: Knox Case Could Pit Extradition Treaty Against U.S. Constitution,
REUTERS (March 26, 2013, 8:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/27/us-italy-knox-extraditionidUSBRE 92Q01020130327 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (quoting Knox’s attorney, Carlo Dalla
Vedova).
253. See supra Part IV (explaining the Italian appeal and determining that the same appeal would not be
heard in an American court).
254. See, i.e., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). In this case, the defendant, like Knox, was
convicted of murder; he then brought a federal habeas corpus petition. Id. The federal district court found
insufficient evidence for premeditation and granted the writ. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
there was some evidence of defendant’s intent to kill the victim. Id. The Supreme Court upheld this decision. Id.
Thus, the conviction was upheld, despite the finding at one point in the procedural process that there was
insufficient evidence to support the murder conviction. This is similar to the scenario witnessed in the Knox
appeals.
255. Id.
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guilty by the appellate court that the United States would not extradite her.
They base this legal conclusion on the extradition treaty currently in force
257
between Italy and the United States. Article VI of this treaty states,
“Extradition shall not be granted when the person sought has been convicted,
acquitted or pardoned, or has served the sentence imposed, by the Requested
258
Party for the same acts for which extradition is requested.” The “requested
259
party” is the state receiving the request—here, the United States. Thus, the
treaty only excuses extradition of a US citizen by the US State Department when
that citizen has already been convicted, acquitted, or served her sentence under
260
the US court system. While American legal pundits may be unwilling to accept
that under the Italian system Knox has not suffered a form of double jeopardy,
they cannot deny that she has not completed any form of judicial proceeding in
the United States that would amount to double jeopardy. Therefore, there is no
language justifying extradition refusal (if the request is ever made). In fact, in
2010, a federal court in California found that a man acquitted of murder in
Mexico and later convicted after Mexican prosecutors appealed the acquittal
261
could not claim double jeopardy to avoid extradition to Mexico. That court
cited a 1974 decision from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York that
reached the same conclusion with respect to Canadian law, which also allows the
262
government to appeal an acquittal. Thus, the U.S. has a history of upholding
similar extradition requests under treaties like that of the Italy-United States
Extradition Treaty, even where the defendant submits to a retrial after acquittal.
Consequently, it is not surprising that the US State Department has refused to
263
affirmatively state that it would deny a request to extradite Knox.
As the Italian appeals court retries the Knox case in September of 2013, there
is no question that the world will continue to watch—and inevitably remark
upon—the proceedings. The only question is whether the legal commentary will
seek a more enlightened path upon this retrying.

256. See Baynes, supra note 252 (quoting Christopher Blakesley, a law professor at the University of
Nevada Las Vegas, as stating, ““If Knox is found guilty, there’s still a whole lot of room for battle before she
would ever be extradited. . .”).
257. Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the Republic of Italy, U.S.-Italy, April 18, 1984.
258. Id. at art. VI (emphasis added).
259. See generally id. (using “requested party” throughout the treaty to refer to the state receiving the
request)
260. Id. at art. VI.
261. Baynes, supra note 251.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
264

Amanda Knox’s “nightmare” began in 2007. Her saga continues six long
years later in the Italian appellate court. And yet, the criticisms of the Italian
265
criminal justice system will likely outlast Knox’s ordeal. While the appellate
process will eventually end for Amanda and her family, the effects of the
American legal community’s critiques will continue. Today’s globalized world
ensures that interactions between foreign legal systems are a modern certainty.
These contacts have the ability to foster communication and understanding
between two or more countries, that no doubt must deal with one another on a
multitude of other critical matters: economic trade, foreign diplomatic ties, and
national security—to name but a few. Showing respect in the judicial realm is
central to demonstrating respect for a country itself.
This is not to say that legal minds of any nation should not feel free to
criticize the judicial system of another country (whether or not it stems from the
trial of one of their own citizens in that foreign country). Making assertions,
backed by research, that a foreign legal system’s procedural and evidentiary
processes fall short of achieving justice or fairness is an entirely respectable
practice. As the Amanda Knox trial demonstrates, however, framing this
criticism as a demonstration of the superiority of one’s own legal system is not
the best method for this practice.
Two of the most criticized aspects of the trial—the admission of Knox’s
statements to police and the admission of character evidence and past bad acts—
could have been admitted in an American criminal court. The Italian criminal
system did, in fact, protect Knox by refusing to admit her statements to police
266
(under per se protections she would not have received in the United States).
The statements were ultimately let in because of the Italian judicial system’s
267
practice of combining civil and criminal trials. Perhaps this practice leads to
unjust results. However, this was not the criticism made by the American legal
community.
And while the American exclusionary rules are much stricter than those of
the Italian system that remains one aspect of a justice system intended to operate
as a whole. As demonstrated, for every reason the American system has for
questioning the reliability or fairness of character evidence, the Italian system has

264. D’Emilio, supra note 241.
265. Even upon her release, Knox herself made “a veiled attack on the Italian justice system. ‘I trusted
them completely,’ she said of the Italian police and legal system. ‘I was betrayed on the night of November 5. I
was manipulated. I am not who they say I am. I did not do the things attributed to me.’ Her frustration, echoed
by many Americans and people from English-speaking countries, was directed squarely at an Italian legal
system that seems alien and menacing to outsiders.” Saunders, Amanda Knox & Dominique Strauss Kahn
Reveal A Continental Divide over Courts, supra note 146.
266. Hooper, Was There a Plot to Murder Meredith?, supra note 47.
267. Id.
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a counter reason for allowing this evidence. The Inquisitorial system considers
the judge and fact-finders as capable of hearing evidence without necessarily
268
using it. This belief undergirds its less strict exclusionary rules. Perhaps this is
naïve or unjust as well, but as noted, the American system could have also
admitted much of this evidence and, as sociological research has established, has
269
poor protections (jury instructions) against its misuse by jurors.
Moreover, as the analysis of Knox’s initial appeal validated, the trial is but
one part of an overall judicial system. The Italian system is aware of its leniency
in allowing evidence and testimony in, and so ensures protections by its equally
270
lenient appellate process. Ultimately, this granted an appellate result—the just
result these critics argued for—that would have never come in an American
court. And while the current dialogue of “double jeopardy” has once again
painted the Italian system as unjust, this too is an incorrect assessment of the
Italian system.
The point here is not necessarily to praise the Italian criminal justice system
or to question the American criminal justice system, but rather to learn from the
heated, often vitriolic exchange between the United States and Italy that
continues to dominate the Amanda Knox trial. This atmosphere lingers and
spreads, despite—as the above exercise established—the fact that neither side
really has reason for anger. The Italian criminal trial of Amanda Knox has
proceeded according to the evidentiary and procedural rules of that system, rules
which are grounded in that nation’s traditions, beliefs, and culture. The trial may
or may not have gone differently in the United States, but it is entirely possible,
at the very least, that some of the most criticized aspects would have received the
same treatment, while the sought-after overturning of Knox’s guilty verdict
would not have received the same treatment.
Despite this, it is likely that the next trial of an American in Europe or of an
European in America is already stained with the negativity and anger that has
arisen in the Amanda Knox trial, casting a shadow over a proceeding that has not
271
even begun. Unless, of course, both choose to learn from this past interaction
268. See Mirabella, supra note 58, at 251.
269. See Liberman & Arndt, supra note 193–97 and accompanying text (discussing the ineffectiveness of
jury instructions).
270. See supra note Part III (discussing Italian appellate review of factual issues and American appellate
review of primarily legal issues only).
271. It seems, in fact, that this has already occurred. Throughout the summer of 2012, “Europeans looked
at the adversarial judicial system used in English-speaking countries with shock and dismay,” as a result of the
Dominque Strauss-Kahn case. Mr. Strauss-Kahn, a then French presidential candidate and managing director of
the International Monetary Fund, was accused of raping a hotel maid in New York. Saunders, Amanda Knox &
Dominique Strauss Kahn Reveal A Continental Divide over Courts, supra note 148. Europeans spoke out
against the adversarial system’s lack of truth seeking. Celebrity philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy wrote, “I am
troubled by a system of justice modestly termed ‘adversary,’ meaning that anyone can come along and accuse
another fellow of any crime – and it will be up to the accused to prove that the accusation is false and without
basis in fact….” Id. The European critics believed “Mr. Strauss-Kahn . . . was paraded before cameras and
subjected to lurid accusations from the prosecutor. In an inquisitive system, they argued, the judge would have
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by replacing hostile, biased comparison with reasoned research and
understanding of the other’s judicial system before speaking to that system’s
flaws. Such a practice allows the focus to remain on the judicial proceeding
itself, and thus to focus on the real issues up for debate.
Throughout the Amanda Knox debacle, Meredith Kercher’s family often
stated they felt as if their innocent daughter, the victim of the heinous crime and
the actual reason for the trial, was entirely forgotten amidst the cacophony of
272
media and talking legal heads. In the future, let us hope that the American legal
community will stop to first listen and learn before becoming a notable noisemaker in a trial involving one of its citizens abroad. This should be done out of
respect for those involved in the proceeding itself, but also for the broader legal
system that proceeding is a part of. Out of this initial silence, much may be
gained.

dismissed the accusations before they had a chance to damage the reputation of Mr. Strauss-Kahn. In New
York, the charges were only thrown out afterward.” Id.
This critique mirrors the Amanda Knox case in that it criticizes the foreign system by exemplifying its
own superior system—all without reference to the theory behind that nation’s legal system. In this case, the
critics failed to understand that in an adversarial system, “the prosecution and defense are both allowed an equal
say, and an equal chance to denounce or defend the accused, before a neutral judge and jury who are simply
asked to weigh the strongest argument. There is no central effort to determine the absolute truth of the
case. . .[because] it is assumed that this truth will emerge from the process of deliberation and evidence
presentation between the two sides.” Id.
272. Kington, Meredith Kercher Has Been Forgotten, Says Family, supra note 152.
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